Two days after the Maoists blew up a bus carrying civilians and Special Police Officers (SPO) in Dantewada on May 17, the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) met in Delhi to re-assess the government’s strategy. The meeting, sources said, was a muted one, with the majority having already arrived at a consensus that offensive air power was not an option against the Maoists.There has been a clamour to deploy air power, but the government has treated such proposals with a sense of circumspection. In the days preceding the CCS meet, much of the consensus had already begun worked out in the South Block, which houses the prime minister’s office and the defence ministry. In the North Block, home ministry officials prepared copious notes for the meeting. But by the time it began, defence minister A.K. Antony and the PM had already reached an agreement and the issue of air power was not even on the table. Yes, efforts to contain the Maoists need to be stepped up, they said. More helicopters could be pressed into service. But aircraft would not be used to conduct offensive operations.
The MHA officials tried to make a distinction between the use of “armed” helicopters and “armoured” helicopters. They pointed out that helicopters armoured to withstand fire from AK-47s could be deployed to prevent attacks like the one that claimed the lives of 31 people in Dantewada.
What Antony’s position reflected was the concerns raised by the IAF in briefings on issues related to the Maoist threat. Collateral damage—a euphemism for the death of innocents in an area of conflict—is a possibility. But the IAF has a bigger worry—if an aircraft were lost while undertaking offensive operations, the effect on its image could be catastrophic. “Not only will we be seen as a force fighting our own people, we will also be seen as a force which was shot down by our own people,” a senior IAF officer told Outlook. “We have also impressed upon the government that we are a force designed to counter external threats. Using air power against the Maoists would prove an unmitigated disaster.”
The MHA officials tried to make a distinction between the use of “armed” helicopters and “armoured” helicopters. They pointed out that helicopters armoured to withstand fire from AK-47s could be deployed to prevent attacks like the one that claimed the lives of 31 people in Dantewada.
What Antony’s position reflected was the concerns raised by the IAF in briefings on issues related to the Maoist threat. Collateral damage—a euphemism for the death of innocents in an area of conflict—is a possibility. But the IAF has a bigger worry—if an aircraft were lost while undertaking offensive operations, the effect on its image could be catastrophic. “Not only will we be seen as a force fighting our own people, we will also be seen as a force which was shot down by our own people,” a senior IAF officer told Outlook. “We have also impressed upon the government that we are a force designed to counter external threats. Using air power against the Maoists would prove an unmitigated disaster.”
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